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gent UNITA rebels, Jonas Sav imbi, was
ki lled in February of2002.
A peace me mo ra nd um was sig ned
on Ap ril 4rh rhar allows rhe movemenr
of fo rmer UNJTA soldiers into 35 cantonment areas where demobilization and
disarmamenr activities coinc ide with
retraining and repatriating former combaranrs and their fami lies. Of particular
concern, though, is rhar rhe government
underestimated rhe numbers of returning soldiers and rhei r fami lies with more
than 79,000 arriving with 236,000 family members. This has overwhelmed rhe
Angolan government and rheir movement
throughout the country is on ly exacerbated by rhe land mi ne problems. T hus
far, the d emobil ization process has been
less than effic ient wirh rhe confusio n
between the government and Un ited
Nations (UN) effectively isolating rhe
NGOs and aid groups. Confusion is preventing action. Landmines don't care.
Of rhe 2,610 known m inefields in
Angola, less rhan a fifth have been cleared
and released for public use. Many more
m inefields remai n in fo rmer UNITAconrrolled areas and rhe extent ro which
roads, airporrs, bridges, railways and other
infrasrrucrure may be mi ned is unknown
to anyo ne. While much of the world has
abandoned Angola for perry political reasons, a s mall handful of mi ne cleara nce

NGOs have remained present, dete rmined ro keep roads open, fie lds clear and
hope al ive. On e of rhose, rhe German
charity Srifru ng Menschen gege n M in en
(MgM) is one of rhe most well known
and highly respected dem ining cha ri ties
in Angola, and rh is is our view.

Impact of the War
The horror of landmines only magnifies rhe crisis in basic health provision
in Angola. H ealth professionals and aid
groups ca nnot travel safely on m ined
roads ro address basic health needs.
Nea rly every hospital, clinic and health
facility in rh e country has been destroyed.
lr is nor uncommon to fmd shocking
da il y deaths due to malaria, malnurririon
and orher prevemable diseases. Immunizarion rates in Angola are among rhe lowest
in rhe world. About half of rhe children
under five in Angola are underweight and
ar critical risk to a variety of diseases. No
trained anendam ar births directly contributes to rhe astonishing 172 deaths per
I ,000 births in Angola. Angola is one of
five countries nor to eradicate polio.
Opening access routes is rhe first step.
The educational systems in Angola
are in a shambles. Si nce children are rhe
fu ture ofany country, Angola is guaranreed
a generational dependency on outside aid.

•

38

•

The war destroyed over
5,000 schools in Angola
and those who do manage ro periodically make
ir to overcrowded classrooms- sometimes
holding as many as 90
in one room-have few
resources with which to
learn. Even with access
to educa ti on, chi ldren
frequen tly arrive late or
leave early to help earn
a living for rheir families. About three our of
ten rural women over
I 5 can read or write.
Only a third reach fifth
grade and none bur rhe
children ofAngola's rich
governmental elite have
rh e opportunity fo r
higher education. Teachers musr overcome land mines ro reach rhe
srudenrs.
T he cam ps are the focal po ints of
inrernarional arrenrion bur rhe greater
human tragedy swirl ing around rhcm are
mi ll ions of displaced Angolans rhar have
been avoiding rhe fighting for decades.
Adding to rhis number is another half
million or so emerging from previously
held UNITA area. Women and yo ung
girls are particularly at risk as rhey forage
for food, wood and water. The number
of displaced people in Angola is d ifficul t
to measure bur NGOs indicate it could
be over four m illion with about halfbeing
children. In Moxico alone, there are over
250,000 disp laced and rhey a re expecti ng another 350,000 to emerge from
former UN ITA areas. As if the daily horror ofrhe exposure of war were nor enough,
as many as halfofthose are reported to have
witnessed a landmine incident. Trying ro
address this has been difficult since less rhan
30 percent of the $233 million (U.S.)
sought in an inter-agency appeal has actually been received.

The UN Role
The UN is nor viewed in Angola as
an enriry rhar can be crusred, and for good
reason. The government of A ngola has
resisted giving UN aid agencies any deft-

nire role in rhe process and almost no involvement in the administration of rhe
camps. The Angolan government quickly
points our rhar rhe UN peace agreements
brokered in 1991 and 1994 enabled
UNITA to rearm and rebuild and rhar
fu rther UN involvement could once
again forrif)r UN ITA borh logistically and
politically. T h ey are determined rhar rhis
will nor happen again.
The recent survey report from rhe
Geneva l nrernarional Center for Huma nitarian Demining (GICHD) (The

Mine Action Sector in Angola-Mission Report) is an example of rhe UN's desire to
expa nd UN influence and control over
rhe landmine process in Angola. While
minimizing and dism issing rhe role of
INAROEE, rhe report does support rhe
new inter-mi n isterial coordination body
(CN IDA H ) bu r recommends the injection of UN advisors and the replacement
of the Angolan landmine database wirh
rhe UN's Informatio n Management System for M ine Action (IMSMA) system
rhar was designed to give evenrual UN
ove rsigh t over fu nd ing and resources going inro national programs. While rhe
report acknowledges many of rhe cha lle nges, ir did li rrle ro recommend
Angolan solutions ro Angolan problems.
The United Nations had also been
a major obstacle toward peace by continuing travel sanctions on members of

UNITA rhat hampered the free move- governments and private donations. A
ment of parry represen tatives so crucial
major problem is rhat demining is only
ro rhe political reintegration of UN ITA as a being conducted in eight of Angola's 18
viable political parry in Angola. This ban provinces. The following demining orhas si nce been lifted, but the continued ganizations have operational bases, with adobstacles ro a
equate funding levels, in these provinces:
workable peace NGO
Provlnce(s)
presented by Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
Huila, Malanje, Kwanza Norte, Moxico
rhe United Na- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Moxico, Cunene
tions are nor HALO Trust
Huambo, Bie, Benguela (Cubal)
unnoticed.
INAROEE remains a viable entity
Two other demining organizations,
in Angola though plagued with the same I NTERSOS of Italy and Sta. Barbara of
resource constraints as other governmen- Germany, have no funding committed
tal activities. They have pur together a for 2002 and are not active in thei r opmobile ream in Bie Province working erational province of Huila. This means
wirh T-55 tanks equipped with KMT-5
rha r rhe following provinces have no
rollers. They have also begun coordinat- demining cover at the moment: Luanda,
in g with the Angolan Armed Forces Kwanza Sui, Uige, Zaire, Benguela (ex(FAA) combat engineers who will have a cept Cuba!), Cuando Cubango, Lunda
25 percent representation on rheirdemining Norte, Lunda Sui, Namibe and Cabinda.
reams. The INARO EE Dem ini ng School This may change as coordinating comar ETAM is operational and rhe instruc- mittees in provincial cap itals work with
tors who were trained by Sourh Africa arc government officials to get their mine
in camp and preparing for an influx of action needs into rhe national Critical
deminers, surveyors, explosive ordnance Needs Assessment and adequate resources
disposal (EOD) personnel and team lead- are allocated as a result.
The World Food Program (WFP)
ers ready for retraining.
contin ues to address rhe hunger situation
Demining Priorities
in Angola, compares it to the mine threat
in former areas of hostilities, and sets priThe majority of mine clearance in orities. In Malanje, WFP needed to clear
Angola continues to be done by a small and prepare areas outside the ciry to allow
group of NGOs unilaterally funded via all Internally Displaced Peoples (lOPs)
within the ciry limits at least
0.5 hectare of arable land.
This was done to reduce dependency on food aid received
from WFP. Likewise in H uila,
WFP feels that one of rhe biggest th rears to the development of safe areas for safety
of the population and resettlement is large stockpiles of ammunition. The first priority
given to MgM is the clearance
of a huge cache rha r exists ar
the end of the runway, next
to rhe hospital in rhe town of
Caconda. There are more sires
to follow.
These priorities were
written up last year when
there was lirde hope of peace
in Angola. Now the situation
is continually changing. Ar

• Only t horoughly t rained explosive detection dogs are being deployed in the mine sweeping projects of
MgM. c/o MgM, People Against Landmines
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the NGO level, th e re is still a certai n
amounr of confusion as to wh at is happening inside the country. It is reported
rhar rhe UN ITA fighters are going into
thei r designated holding camps, handing
in thei r weapons in pre para tion to be inregrated into the FAA as well as being fed
and receiving a salary, though thi s may
only be the officer corps for rhe moment.
The main fear for so me organizations is
rhat those troops designated for demobilization may not be trained adequately for reintegration inro society.
Much of rhe donor hesitation revolves
around the simpl e fact rhat Angola is, on
paper, one of rhe wealthiest coun tries on
the African continent in terms of irs natural resources. Almost all agree rhar rhe
Ango la n government itself must play a
large role in clearing landmines and addressing the panoply of ills affiicting the victims
of mines. Toward that end , a pledge of
• Graves in Angola.
c/o Guy Tillim for
MgM

$57 m illion was set aside by Angola from
which demining was ro have received
around a 10 percent share. The NGOs
in Angola all report little optimism that
this will ever reach them and none believe it will actually get spent.

A Matter of Access
Demining is an importam parr of
the peace process. Parti cul arly, it helps to
provide safe access to aid groups, while
also allowing them more freedom of
movement. Unfortunately, the problem
is that the same freedom is afforded ro
the Angolan population. On a positive note
this freedom mea ns that the usual military-o rganized co nvoys are a thing of the
past. As an example, there are large groups
of people who gather to the east ofViana ,

who rhen proceed homewards. This is not
thought ro be a spon taneous relocation
out of Luanda, but rather fami ly members returning to their homes ro grow
crops ro return and sell them in Luanda.
The rest of the fami ly stays in Luanda to
conti nue as they have for the last few years
since rhey relocated ro the capi tal.
T hroughout the country there are
lOP camps and peopl e residing in safe
cities. T hese displaced peoples arc rhe
o nes who wish ro return to their homes;
they are also the ones who are most at
risk from rhe threat of mines. Also, there
are people who are in areas formally under the control ofUNITA who have been
isolated and require immediate aid. In
both cases, access is the watchword: safe
access ro allow people to return to th eir
homes, and access to allow aid agencies
an d organ izatio ns to support iso lated
com munities most at risk.
This is rhe type o f
operation tha t MgM
specia lizes in , having
cu r its teerh, so ro
speak, in opening up
over 270 kilometers of
roads in rhe jungles of
northeast Bengo Province and allowing over
5 0 ,000 peop le to
safely return to their
homes. Negotiations
will have to be entered
inro wi rh Provin cia l
Authorities, WFP and oth er bodies to
draw up new plans and priorities. It is
certain rhar in Malanje province the priorities wi ll now change from opening up
land for use by lOPs close ro the city to
open ing roads to allow the TOPs safe access to their homes, a nd also in turn access to markets.

MgM Solutions Need
Support
When pri orities were being prepared
fo r proposals for year 2002, MgM had
been asked by rhe WFP to starr demining
operations in rhe provinces of Malanje
and Huila. This also fi r in with priori ties
requested by the U.S. Department of
State (DOS) for funding purposes for
2002 funding. It also helped for DOS
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funding that WFP is rhe lead agency. This
now means that, on rhe o ne hand, MgM
wi ll be working in the same provinces as
N orwegian Peoples Aid (N PA) while, on
the other hand, there is no funding available fo r MgM's traditional operational
areas of Bengo and Cunene Provinces.
Funds are now being sought to expand
on these projects as well as projects that MgM
wish to continue in Bengo and Cunene.
In Bengo, th ere are over 60,000
lOPs in two camps outside Caxito. Although one group of around 25,000 have
already starred to relocate to areas where
access is open, rhere a re a further 35,000
who come from an area (Dembos) rhar is
co mpletely blocked. Access is available
along tar roads to towns of Ucua, Piri,
Quibaxi and Alto Galu ngo, while roads
to towns of Bula Atumba and Pango
Aluquem and others in the jungle are inaccess ible. The people vacated this area
three and a half years ago and rhe roads
are completely overgrown. Nobody will
atte mpt to drive down them fo r the threat
of mines, forc ing people to stay in the
lOP camps fo r food, security and other
support. W ith fundin g for clearance in this
area, eventually these people will be able
to return hom e. This developed clearance
team will then graduate on to clearance
of routes from Negage and Uige cities, in
Uige Provin ce, to outer commun ities.
Uige has been one on the major recent
barrie zones in Angola, along with
Malanje, Lunda Norte and Moxico. O nce
route clearance has been carried om in
Uige, it can move on to clear the few
routes closed by mines in Za ire Province.
Cunene is another province badly
needin g rome clearance. MgM has an
extens ive maintenance facility developed
in Ondjiva, parr of which is to support
MgM demin ing operations in the southern provinces but also supports other
NGOs in the region. Many com m unities
a re isolated from rhe provincial capital.
This restricts support and forces people,
especially women, to carry goods to main
roads for sale at markets.
Romes eventually have to be opened
into Cuando Cuba ngo, which still has
many areas closed off due to the threat of
mines. Similarly in Moxico, routes also
need to be opened in rhe central and
southern areas o f th e province. MgM had

a priority set by WFP in 1998 for the
ro ute cleara n ce fro m the town of
Cazombo. This wou ld have allowed for
road transportation offood flown in from
Luanda or transported across the border
from Zambia. This project would have
eventually cleared into Cuando C uban go
and on to Cunene linking al l areas with
aid and developmem comi ng from Zambia
and Nami bia. These th ree provinces are
sparsely populated, bur over 200,000
nomads are forced to live outside Angolan
borders. C learance in these areas will allow free movement for these people again.
In 200 1, MgM also carried out two
major surveys. One survey was carried our
at the sire of an old ammun ition storage
site that suffered a major detonation. This
site contained aerial deployed weapons
and is now su rrounded by a residential
a rea. The m ajor ity of the serviceable
ordnance has been moved, tho ugh a substantial amount was left spread over a
large area close to the International Airpo re of Luanda. No check has been done
of what was left in the so il, and a simple
rake can pull up unexploded munitions
where childre n play daily.
The second survey was carried ou t
on rhe Benguela railway line in Huambo.
[r is now obvious that the railway network
in Angola is central ro rhe regeneration
of the interior of the country and especial! y
the towns and cities that lie along those
lines. There appears to be Eu ropean
Union (EU) and possibly Angolan fund ing

available for the reconstruction of these
lines, most of which have to be checked
and cleared oflandmines prior to engineers
starting work on them. Initial contacts
have been made co introduce MgM to
the possible main con tractor for the
developments of these lines and MgM's
extens ive experience clearing th e
Limpopo rail lines in Mozambique are a
valuable reference. The key to rhe future
may be rhe opening of the rail line to the
rich coffee growing area ofNambuangongo.
Both these projects are looked upon as high
priority, for the safety of the people living in
an ammunition dump who with all likelihood will not return to their original homes,
and for those who would like to eliminate
their dependency on aid in the long term.

Conclusion
The frag ile peace in Angola appears
to be a reali ty, and demining is an integral
part of sustaining this very delicate process. There h ave been discussions about
large amoun ts of aid pledged for Angola,
bur this appears to be far offat rhe momen r.
Dono rs seem to be waiting for more developments and possibly sma ll successes
in the short term before committing. The
problem is rhar all NGOs in Angola have
been under-funded for years relative to
the task at hand, and their equipment
needs alone may nor permit the ki nd of
progress needed. Donor reluc tance may
be responsible for hundreds of preventable
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Angolan deaths. Mines can be cleared now.
Without increased support at this
critical junction, the lack of access by
WF P and other aid groups and the lack
of simple in fo rmation will indeed doom
thousands of Angolans to starvatio n as
they continue to roam the m ine infested
roads and fields in search of life itself.
MgM is ded icated to resolving this and
has pledged itself to con tinued relief in
one of Africa's keys to future econom ic
growth, rich in both resources and culture.
MgM remains at the front and welcomes
additional assistance and support. We also
gratefully acknowledge the tremendous
fin ancial contri b utio ns of the U.S. State
D epartment's Humanitarian Demining
Program Office in recogn itio n of the
value of our efforts. Please visit our web
sire or contact us to learn more. The wo nderful people of Angola deserve you r
thoughts, prayers and cons ideration . •
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